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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the distribution of employee income in Slovenia in the period 
1991–2009. The analysis is based on two different datasets, both derived from the 
personal income tax files. It was shown that income inequality of employees income has 
somewhat increased in this period, using the Gini coefficient as the indicator of income 
inequality. Though increases in income inequality were moderate according to this 
summary measure, rather largest changes did occur at the very top of the income 
distribution, i.e. top 5 per cent and top one per cent of employees. Income inequality of 
employees’ net income (i.e. net of employee social contributions and personal income 
tax) remained fairly stable in this time period. In other words, the changes in personal 
income tax dampened to a large degree the effects of increasing inequality in the 
distribution of employee gross income. This was also established using the Kakwani 
index of progressivity. Increases in progressivity of the personal income tax came in 
leaps, mostly following the introduction of new income tax legislation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The interest in income inequality is not waning. However, the focus of particular 
interest has been shifting, as researchers have in recent years devoted much attention to 
the analysis of the very top of the income distribution, also by extending the data series 
into the distant past. Though our analysis does not cover “the very long run of history” 
(Atkinson et al., 2011), it does cover a sufficiently long period of time. Slovenia gained 
independence in 1991 and introduced its – admittedly short lived – currency, the 
Slovenian tolar. In 2007, Slovenia joined the Euro zone and adopted the euro. In this 
sense, the 1991–2009 period has been quite eventful. However, any attempt to extend 
the analysis further back in time, to cover the pre-1991 period (when Slovenia was a 
constituent republic of the Yugoslavian federation), would entail insurmountable 
methodological difficulties. Namely, the socialist system did not recognize the concept 
of gross income, and there was no personal income tax in the modern sense of the 
word1. Thus, prior to 1991, only data on net wages are available. 
 
Our analysis will deal with income inequality of the labour active population, more 
precisely, of employees. Thus, self-employed persons, persons active in agriculture and 
other active persons, who do not have employee status, will not be included. 
Furthermore, our analysis will take the individual as a statistical unit; we will not deal 
with household income. However, in spite of this “partiality” such an analysis also 
provides an indication of what was happening at the household level, as wages and 
salaries account for more than 60 per cent of disposable household income. Changes in 
the distribution of these incomes also provide a good indication of the trend in the 
distribution of household incomes. As for the “partiality” of our analysis, we can quote 
Binder (1993, p. 308), who wrote, referring to the USA data, that “if you want to 
understand the rise in income inequality in the 1980s, the place to start is with the rise in 
wage inequality”. To which we might add Atkinson’s’ comment (1998, p. 19): “I agree, 
but one should not stop here”. To which we might further add that Atkinson at times 
“did stop here” and analyzed the distribution of individual earnings in twenty country 
members of the OECD (cf. Atkinson, 2008). 
 
We have already mentioned the strong research emphasis on the very top of the income 
distribution, doubtlessly necessitated by the large increases in the income shares 
accruing to these high-income earners. A recent research by Atkinson et al. (2011) has 
demonstrated a large increase in the share of income accruing to this top in a number of 
developed countries, but with more moderate increases in most central European 
countries (not including ex-socialist countries). A similar conclusion is also reached by 
OECD (2008). In this sense Slovenia appears to share some characteristics of developed 
countries of Central Europe, experiencing rather stable inequality, with moderate 
increases in the past twenty years. 
 
The structure of our analysis is as follows. Section 2 will present both data sources used 
in our analysis. Section 3 will provide a comparison of some basic indicators, such as 
employment and average wages, from these data sources and from the official source – 
the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. In Section 4 we will present the 
                                                 
1 Only certain types of income were taxed, i.e. income from contractual work. 
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structure of gross income: personal income tax (PIT), social security contributions and 
net income, net income being obtained by subtracting PIT and social security 
contributions from gross income. The distribution of gross income across income 
quintiles is presented, as well as the distribution of PIT. We show that the changes in 
the share of PIT paid, by income quintiles, can clearly be traced to changes in the PIT 
legislation. This legislation has – through the years – strongly emphasized the lowering 
of the tax burden for the low-income population. Section 5 is devoted to the analysis of 
income inequality and the role of the tax system in mitigating the effects of the rise in 
inequality of the distribution of gross income. Section 6 presents a brief analysis of the 
dynamics of PIT progressivity, using the Kakwani index as a measure. Section 7 offers 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data sources 
 
Our analysis is based on two data sources. Both of these are not generally available to 
the public, but have been acquired (specifically for this research) from the Statistical 
Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS) and the Tax Administration of the Republic 
of Slovenia (TARS). 
 
Data source A 
 
This data source was obtained from SORS. Using the statistical registry of the labour 
active population (Statistični register delovno aktivnega prebivalstva – SRDAP) and tax 
file returns from TARS, a population of employees was extracted for each year, 
satisfying both of the following criteria: (a) employed full-time (meaning that the data 
in the registry indicate that the person is working at least 36 hours per week), and (b) 
employed at the same employer throughout the year. The data are delivered in tabular 
form with 14 income groups. There is differentiation according to the sector of 
employment (private, public) and gender (male, female), so that there are in effect four 
tables for each year. The tables include all (itemized) sources of income subject to tax, 
as well as withheld PIT and employee social security contributions. The tables cover the 
period from 1993 to 2008. 
 
Data source B 
 
This data source was obtained from TARS. These are actually large random samples 
extracted from the PIT files, i.e. covering all persons liable for PIT. Each of these 
annual samples includes about 60 thousand taxable persons, representing some 5 per 
cent of all persons liable for PIT. For the 2005–2009 period TARS provided an even 
larger random sample, covering some 10 per cent of persons liable for PIT. Data for 
each person include the following: age of birth, sex, gross income (for each income 
source subject to tax), employee social security contributions, withheld PIT and final 
PIT liability. This data source covers the period from 1991 to 2009. 
 
Both data sources have their “strong” and “weak” selling points. In view of Atkinson’s 
A/B/C classification (Atkinson, 2007; Atkinson, 2008), both sources could be classified 
in the A group, signifying high quality data. Data source A offers possibilities for 
comparisons between the public and private sector – something that data source B does 
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not provide. However, data source A starts with 1993, and thus does not cover the most 
dramatic early period of transition from a socialist to a market economy. In addition, to 
be noted is the fact that this data source contains only data on withheld PIT and not data 
on final PIT liability. In view of the described selection rules, data set A contains a 
fairly homogeneous population of employees. 
 
As data source B represents a random sample of all persons liable for PIT, employees 
have to be extracted. Furthermore, there is no information on sector of employment. 
Additionally, there is no information on the period within the year, during which the 
income has been earned; source A solves this problem by including only employees 
who have worked during the whole year. Thus a person could have earned income only 
during two months and still be included in the PIT file2. Needless to say, the average 
monthly income of this person will be low, as his “annual” income (earned during two 
months) is low. However, the advantage of this data source is that it starts with 1991 
and that it contains data on the final PIT liability. As these are sample data, the 
estimated values of various indicators are subject to sampling errors; due to large 
samples the estimated standard errors of estimates are rather small and shall not be 
presented here. 
 
3. A comparison of indicators from the data sources and official statistics 
 
In this section, we will provide a comparison of the values of several indicators. We 
start with the number of employees. Official data on the number of employees, 
published by the Statistical yearbook of the SORS, include all employees3. The number 
refers to annual average (obtained from monthly data). Data source A is somewhat more 
restrictive, in that it does not include: (a) persons working part-time, (b) persons who 
have not worked the whole year, and (c) persons who have changed their employer in a 
given year. 
 
What about data source B? We first extracted employees according to the single 
criterion that wages and/or wage compensations received by the person in a given year 
must be positive. In our previous research (Stanovnik and Verbič, 2005a) we extracted 
employees according to two cumulative criteria: (a) value of wages and/or wage 
compensations is positive, (b) value of vacation allowance is positive. We have set the 
second criterion because the vacation allowance is a statutory element of the labour 
compensation package, with minimum amounts of these vacation allowances being the 
result of negotiations between the social partners and spelled out in collective 
agreements4. If the worker is employed part-time, he is entitled to receive an 
                                                 
2 Of course, this person would be included in the PIT file only if gross annual incomes exceed the amount 
of the general personal allowance. This allowance is in the form of a deduction. 
3 From 2005 these data include owners of firms (actually, firms with one employee) and other persons not 
insured as self-employed persons. These persons actually pay wages to themselves. 
4 There are also strong inducements to disburse only minimum amounts of these vacation allowances. 
Namely, from 1994 onward amounts of vacation allowance greater than the stipulated minimum amount 
were subject to corporate income tax. From 1998 onward, values that surpassed the stipulated minimum 
amount were also subject to social contributions. 
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appropriate part of the annual vacation allowance5. Similarly, if a worker is employed 
by an employer e.g. for three months in a year, he is entitled to 3/12 of the minimum 
mount. 
r. On the other hand, their 
clusion also results in lower estimates of average wages. 
 given year (and received wages and/or wage compensations) 
nd were liable for PIT. 
g a PIT return) hardly 
hanged (798 thousand) in comparison to 2008 (799 thousand). 
the only excluded group are employees working for the self-employed . As a rule, these 
a
 
Regardless of these legal obligations, it appears that numerous employers are in breach 
of the law and do not disburse vacation allowances to their workers; our estimates 
indicate that some 10 per cent of all workers do not receive these allowances. Excluding 
this group of workers from our analysis does not seem warranted, in spite of the fact 
that their wages are quite low and that – in all likelihood – they are being employed 
part-time and/or for only several months during the yea
in
 
Table 1 presents a comparison of the (average) number of employees according to the 
Statistical Yearbook of the SORS, the number of employees according to data source A 
and estimated number of employees according to data source B. We reiterate that the 
estimates from data source B – unlike data from official statistical sources and data from 
data source A – do not refer to average annual data, but refer to the total number of 
persons who worked in a
a
 
In times of rapid changes in the labour market – which Slovenia has been experiencing 
since 2009 – the number of employees according to data source B is not really 
informative, as it does not indicate a timely change in trend. In addition, unlike the 
official data and data from data source A, the number of employees from data source B 
is quite susceptible to changes in PIT legislation; an increase in the personal allowance 
(deduction) may result in a lower number of persons liable for PIT6, and thus fall in 
“employment”. This is clearly seen from Table 1, with the average number of 
employees according to official statistical sources registering a decrease in 2009 – from 
790 thousand in 2008 to 752 thousand in 2009 – whereas according to data sources B, 
the total number of persons being employed in 2009 (and filin
c
 
What can we say about wages? Here we compare the values of the official average 
monthly wage, published in the Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia, with 
the computed average monthly wage from data sources A and B. It must be noted that 
the official average wage is actually being computed on a subset of all employees. Thus, 
in 1991 employees in private enterprises and employed by the self-employed were not 
taken into account. The subset was enlarged in 1992, when employees in larger private 
enterprises (with at least three employees) were included. Since 2005, all employees in 
private enterprises are included in the official calculation of the average wage, so that 
7
                                                 
5 Even some categories of part-time workers are entitled for a full vacation allowance. These are workers 
rkers working part-time or full-time, workers on a permanent or temporary labour 
who are partially disabled and receive part of their wage compensation from the Institute for pension and 
disability insurance (Zavod za pokojninsko in invalidsko zavarovanje – ZPIZ). 
6 Persons whose income is lower than the personal allowance do not have to file a PIT return and are thus 
not included in the PIT database - neither in data source A nor in data source B. 
7 In computing the official average wage, all workers in the above stated subset are included. This means 
the inclusion of wo
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workers have low registered wages, due to possibilities for payment in cash. Due to this 
excluded group of workers from the computation of the official average wage, it is not 
surprising that the official average wage is somewhat higher than the average wage 
computed from data source A, as seen from Table 2. 
 
Table 1: The number of employees according to different statistical sources (in 
thousands), 1991–2009 
 
Year Statistical Yearbook Data source A Data source B 
1991 746  762 
1992 692  725 
1993 666 525 741 
1994 647 517 733 
1995 642 533 743 
1996 635 527 740 
1997 651 528 736 
1998 652 545 745 
1999 671 563 747 
2000 683 575 747 
2001 695 584 755 
2002 698 579 769 
2003 699 570 763 
2004 703 582 774 
2005 732 596 764 
2006 742 594 774 
2007 766 606 779 
2008 790 614 799 
2009 752  798 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS, 1992–2010); own computations from 
data sources A and B. 
 
The lowest estimated values of the average wage are according to data source B. Here, 
the average monthly wage is computed by dividing the annual value of wages (as 
specified in the PIT tax form) by 12. Namely, we do not know how many months the 
person has actually been working, or whether he has been working full-time or part-
time, so we simply assume that the person has been working full-time during the year. 
 
In spite of these differences in the data sets, we can observe from Figure 1 a quite 
consistent trend for the average wage (in real terms) from all the three statistical 
sources. The average wage has been steadily increasing (in real terms) since 1992. Of 
course, the values of the average wage (in real terms) according to data source B are the 
lowest, as the average wage for every worker was computed assuming the worker was 
employed full time and throughout the year. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
ntract. A person who worked only two months would have his average wage computed on the basis of 
ese two months. 
co
th
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Table 2: The average monthly wage according to different data sources, 1991–2009 
 
Statistic rbook Data A Data  Year al Yea  source  source B
1991 16.8  15.4 
1992 51.0  45.3 
1993 75.4 77.5 68.3 
1994 94.6 94.6 83.1 
1995 112.0 108.8 97.1 
1996 129.1 123.5 111.5 
1997 144.3 135.4 123.0 
1998 158.1 152.2 135.5 
1999 173.2 166.5 149.1 
2000 191.7 184.8 165.7 
2001 214.6 206.3 184.9 
2002 235.4 227.3 204.7 
2003 253.2 248.5 221.7 
2004 267.6 261.4 
27 .5 
235.4 
2005 
2006 
277.3 
290.6 
5
0.
252.0 
267.4 29 7 
2007 1,285 1,286 1,184 
2008 1,391 1,400 1,286 
2009 1,439  1,319 
 
Note: For the period 1991–2006 nominal gross wages are in thousand SIT, while from 2007 onward the 
alues are in thousand Ev UR. 
omputations from 
ata sources A and B. 
 
Figure 1: The average gross wage (in 2000 prices) in tolars, 1991–2009 
 
 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS, 1992–2010); own c
d
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Note: For the conversion of nominal gross wages to real gross wages we use the consumer price index 
(CPI). For the 2007–2009 period the conversion from EUR into SIT is performed using the exchange rate 
39.64 SIT/EUR. 2
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Source: Statist
ata sources A 
ical Yearbook of the Republic of Slovenia (SORS, 1992–2010); own computations from 
and B. 
d by 
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Tab  Withheld PIT, employee ibutio come  
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4. The structure of gross income: PIT, employee social contributions and net 
income 
 
In Section 3 we have established that the real average wage has been steadily increasing 
since 1992. This assertion is quite robust and holds regardless of the data source used. 
The increase in net income of the employees has been even more pronounced, as seen 
from Tables 3 and 4, which show an increasing share of net income in the gross income 
of employees8. As data source A does not contain data on final PIT, the actual net 
ncome could not be computed. That is why we refer to “net” income, obtainei
subtracting withheld PIT and employee social contributions from gross income. This i
seen in Table 3. Table 4 is based on data source B; here net income is obtained b
g actual PIT paid and employee social contrsu
 
le 3:  social contr ns and “net” in  as a share of
ome o
Year ss inco hheld P tributions t” inco
1993 1.000 0.140 0.218 0.642 
1994 1.000 0.142 0.205 0.654 
1995 1.000 0.143 0.200 0.658 
1996 1.000 0.146 0.198 0.656 
1997 1.000 0.145 0.198 0.657 
1998 1.000 0.147 0.202 0.652 
1999 1.000 0.148 0.202 0.649 
2000 1.000 0.150 0.204 0.647 
2001 1.000 0.150 0.204 0.646 
2002 1.000 0.151 0.204 0.645 
2003 1.000 0.152 0.204 0.644 
2004 1.000 0.152 0.203 0.645 
2005 1.000 0.142 0.201 0.657 
2007 1.000 0.131 0.204 0.665 
34 0.204 0.662 
2006 1.000 0.144 0.204 0.653 
2008 1.000 0.1
 
Note: “Net” income refers to gross income minus withheld PIT minus employee social contributions. 
 
Source: Own computations from data source A. 
 
As seen from Table 4, the share of PIT in the gross income of employees has decreased 
from 14.9 per cent in 1991 to 12.6 per cent in 2009, whereas the share of employee 
social contributions has decreased from 22.9 percent to 20.3 per cent of gross income in 
the same time period. Both decreasing shares are mostly due to legislative changes9. 
                                                 
8 Wages account for some 90 per cent of employees’ gross income, with vacation allowance accounting 
for a further 5 per cent. 
9 In principle, the decreasing share of employee social contributions could also be due to changes in the 
income composition, say, with the increasing share of income from capital in gross income of employees. 
This income is not subject to social contributions. However, this was not the case. 
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Decreases in the share of PIT occurred in 1994, 2005 and 2007, i.e. the years when new 
PIT legislation was introduced. A decreasing share of employee social contributions is 
isible in the first years of transition, up to 1995, caused by the gradual decrease in the 
 
able 4: PIT, employee social contributions and net income as a share of gross income 
of em a source B
 
Gro me Employee social con   Ne e 
v
statutory employee contribution rate, from 24.79 per cent in 1992 to 22.10 in 1995. 
T
ployees, dat   
Year ss inco PIT tributions t incom
1991 1.000 0.149 0.229 0.623 
1992 1.000 0.146 0.226 0.628 
1993 1.000 0.147 0.217 0.636 
1994 1.000 0.136 0.203 0.661 
1995 1.000 0.139 0.197 0.664 
1996 1.000 0.141 0.195 0.664 
1997 1.000 0.140 0.195 0.664 
1998 1.000 0.138 0.199 0.663 
1999 1.000 0.139 0.200 0.661 
2000 1.000 0.139 0.200 0.661 
2001 1.000 0.138 0.202 0.660 
2002 1.000 0.141 0.201 0.658 
2003 1.000 0.141 0.201 0.658 
2004 1.000 0.143 0.201 0.657 
2005 1.000 0.133 0.199 0.668 
2006 
2007 
1.000 
1.000 
0.133 
0.126 
0.201 
0.201 
0.665 
0.673 
2008 1.000 0.1
2009 1.000 0.1
28 0.201 0.672 
26 0.203 0.671 
 
Source: Own computations from data source B. 
 
In order to provide a better basis for comparison, we also computed the share of 
ithheld PIT in gross income of employees from data source B. A comparison with data 
ame employer throughout the year. Both tables also show the 
are of paid PIT (as percentage of total paid PIT) for the upper 5 per cent and upper 1 
er cent of employees. 
w
source A is provided in Figure 2, which, again, shows remarkable congruence. 
 
The period since 1991 witnessed not only large aggregate changes in the PIT burden 
and (in the initial years) changes in employee social contributions, but also changes in 
the PIT burden across income groups, as can be observed from Tables 5 and 6. The 
changes in the PIT burden are more pronounced in Table 6, which is based on data 
source B and thus includes all employees who were obliged to submit a PIT tax return. 
We recall that data source A (presented in Table 5) includes only employees working 
full time and for the s
sh
p
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Figure 2: The share of withheld PIT in gross income of employees, 1991–2009 
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Table 5: The structure of withheld PIT across 
 
Low  % Quin ps Hig  % T   % 
 
Source: Own computations from data sources A and B. 
 
income quintile groups, data source A  
Year est 20 tile grou2 to 4 hest 20 op 5 % Top 1
1993 7.33 45.64 47.03 21.03 7.34 
1994 5.56 41.36 53.08 26.00 9.58 
1995 5.48 40.61 53.91 26.55 9.58 
1996 5.55 40.15 54.30 26.87 9.76 
1997 5.44 39.92 54.63 27.22 10.00 
1998 5.47 39.36 55.17 27.70 10.64 
1999 5.33 38.82 55.85 28.13 10.78 
2000 5.34 39.19 55.47 27.81 10.72 
2001 5.42 38.85 55.73 27.67 10.66 
2002 5.51 39.22 55.27 27.12 10.59 
2003 5.49 39.08 55.43 26.86 10.45 
2004 5.69 39.12 55.18 26.48 10.34 
2005 4.67 37.73 57.60 27.94 11.06 
2006 4.65 38.45 56.91 27.11 10.59 
2007 4.85 37.38 57.77 28.78 11.47 
2008 4.33 38.00 57.66 28.35 10.92 
 
Source: Own computations from data source A. 
 
Changes in the PIT burden across income groups can occur through several channels: 
(a) legislative changes in the PIT, which include changes in tax brackets, tax rates and 
x reliefs, (b) changes in the income distribution, and (c) changes in the indexation 
les for tax brackets. 
ta
ru
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Table 6: The e of s i le gr a sourc
 
Lowest Quin ps Hig  % T  T  
structur paid PIT acros ncome quinti oups, dat e B 
Year 20 % 
tile grou
2 to 4 hest 20 op 5 % op 1 %
1991 6.61 49.36 44.03 19.01 6.99 
1992 5.60 47.54 46.86 21.62 8.28 
1993 5.26 46.73 48.01 22.31 8.37 
1994 2.31 39.67 58.02 29.48 11.70 
1995 2.37 39.30 58.33 29.50 11.23 
1996 2.43 38.15 59.42 30.51 12.03 
1997 2.37 37.71 59.93 31.29 12.38 
1998 2.43 37.34 60.23 31.66 13.18 
1999 1.10 36.71 62.19 33.12 13.51 
2000 1.01 36.49 62.49 33.54 14.29 
2001 2.30 36.97 60.74 31.25 12.55 
2002 2.28 36.46 61.26 31.75 12.89 
2003 2.31 36.85 60.84 31.32 13.06 
2004 2.34 36.58 61.08 31.91 13.49 
2005 1.55 34.42 64.02 33.52 14.08 
2006 1.74 35.19 63.07 32.50 13.70 
2007 2.01 34.86 63.14 33.44 13.33 
2008 0.86 35.01 64.13 33.95 13.63 
2009 0.72 35.23 64.04 33.12 13.01 
 
Source: Own computations from data source B. 
 
Starting from the third possible cause for changes in the tax burden, i.e. indexation 
rules, we note that up to 2004, the tax brackets have been annually adjusted according to 
the growth of the average wage. The PIT Act, passed in May 2004 (ZDoh-1, Official 
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia 54/2004) changed the indexation rule, so that tax 
brackets were uprated according to the consumer price index. Such indexation has also 
been retained by the PIT legislation, passed in 2006 (ZDoh-2, Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Slovenia 117/2006). If growth of wages is higher than increased in the 
 the relative tax burden. 
hus, the rapid increase in income inequality in 1992 and 1993 resulted in a visible 
nting to 11 per cent of the average national annual wage. 
hus, the tax burden of low-income groups decreased, whereas the burden for higher 
consumer prices, this would cause a gradual drift of employees into higher tax brackets. 
 
Changes in the income distribution can also cause changes in
T
increase in the share of PIT paid by the highest quintile group. 
 
However, there is no doubt that the largest changes in the shares of PIT paid across 
income groups were due to legislative changes. A “quantum leap” occurred in 1994, 
when the new PIT legislation entered into force (Zdoh, Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Slovenia 71/93). This PIT legislation introduced significant changes in the tax 
brackets and tax rates. However, of particular importance was the introduction of a 
personal allowance, amou
T
income groups increased. 
 
A further large decrease in the relative tax burden of low-income groups occurred with 
the passage of the Law on extraordinary decrease of tax liability (ZIZDO), passed in 
10 
 
May 2000 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia 44/2000). This law had a 
retroactive effect for the PIT liability for the year 1999, and was also applied for the tax 
year 2000. It prescribed lower tax liabilities for low-income groups: this was a pre-
election manoeuvre by the government of Dr. Janez Drnovšek. As this law was of 
limited duration, and as the elections were successfully won by the party of dr. Janez 
Drnovšek, there was no strong interest by the government to extend its validity. Thus, in 
2001 the relative tax burden of the low-income group (bottom quintile group) returned 
to its pre-1999 value. Further changes occurred in 2005, when new PIT legislation 
(Zdoh-1) entered into force; this caused a sizeable increase in the personal allowance. 
The frenzy continued toward the end of 2005 with the introduction of cedular taxation 
of most income from capital (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia 115/2005). 
Thus, interest income, dividends and capital gains were henceforth taxed with a final 
ithholding tax amounting to 20 per cent. In other words, these incomes were now 
 (bottom quintile group) further decreased (see also Majcen et al., 2009). 
o sum up, the shares of PIT paid by the low-income groups in Slovenia are now at a 
e groups, 
ith Table 7 referring to data source A and Table 8 to data source B. In both tables, we 
ercentage points in the 1993–2008 period. A large 
art of this increase accrued to the top one percent of employees, whose income share 
increased by 0.89 percentage points. 
                                                
w
being excluded from the PIT tax form. 
 
In 2007, a new PIT Act (ZDoh-2) entered into force (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia, 117/2006). It simplified the system by reducing the number of tax brackets 
from five to three and reduced the top marginal rate from 50 to 41 per cent. Legislative 
changes continued, and in the beginning of 2008 (Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Slovenia 10/2008) important changes were introduced, with a differentiated personal 
allowance; the higher the income, the lower the personal allowance10. Quite possibly, 
the rationale for such a “bizarre” tax allowance, unknown in the fiscal doctrine, was the 
approaching parliamentary elections. Of course, the relative tax burden of the low-
income group
T
historic low. 
 
5. Income inequality 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present the distribution of income (of employees) across quintil
w
further divide the top quintile group into the top 5% and top 1% of employees. 
 
Both tables show that income inequality has increased in this long time period, as the 
shares accruing to the bottom income quintile group and income quintile groups 2 to 4 
have somewhat decreased, whereas the share accruing to the top income quintile group 
has slightly increased. However, these assertions depend on the base year of 
comparison. If we discard the first three years of transition, i.e. the 1991–1993 period, 
the changes in the distribution of income are rather small. However, both data sources 
(A and B) show non-negligible changes at the very top of the income distribution. Thus, 
according to data source A, the share of total gross income accruing to the top income 
quintile group has increased by 2.38 p
p
 
10 Taxpayers with an annual gross income up to 6,800 EUR were entitled to a personal allowance 
(deduction) of 4,959.60 EUR. Taxpayers with an annual gross income from 6,801 to 9,000 were entitled 
to a personal allowance of 3,959.60 EUR, whereas taxpayers with an annual gross income greater than 
9,001 were entitled to a personal allowance amounting to 2,959.60 EUR. 
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The structTable 7: ure of gross income of employees, by income quintile groups, data 
source A 
 
Low  % Quin ups Hig  % T  T  Year est 20 tile gro2 to 4 hest 20 op 5 % op 1 %
1993 9.60 52.27 38.13 14.83 4.69 
1994 9.66 51.65 38.69 15.76 5.09 
1995 9.33 51.40 39.27 16.05 5.08 
1996 9.34 51.00 39.66 16.37 5.27 
1997 9.16 51.02 39.82 16.50 5.35 
1998 9.21 50.58 40.21 16.82 5.66 
1999 9.01 50.18 40.81 17.24 5.84 
2000 9.06 50.27 40.67 17.05 5.76 
2001 9.16 49.93 40.91 17.03 5.75 
2002 9.25 40.12 40.63 16.73 5.69 
2003 9.23 49.90 40.87 16.75 5.70 
2004 9.42 49.73 40.85 16.69 5.72 
2005 9.44 49.79 40.77 16.63 5.81 
2006 9.48 50.15 40.37 16.13 5.43 
2007 9.34 50.08 40.59 16.45 5.75 
2008 9.21 50.27 40.51 16.35 5.58 
 
Source: Own computations from data source A. 
Table 8: ure of gross income of employees by income quintile groups, data 
source B 
 
Low  % Quin ps Hig  % T  T  
 
The struct
Year est 20 tile grou2 to 4 hest 20 op 5 % op 1 %
1991 8.36 54.07 37.57 14.23 4.52 
1992 7.64 53.16 39.20 15.58 5.15 
1993 7.20 52.79 40.01 16.04 5.25 
1994 7.11 52.30 40.59 16.91 5.65 
1995 7.20 51.83 40.97 17.09 5.53 
1996 7.33 51.05 41.62 17.56 5.87 
1997 7.37 50.86 41.77 17.82 5.94 
1998 7.46 50.64 41.90 18.00 6.32 
1999 7.26 49.99 42.74 18.62 6.41 
2000 7.22 49.96 42.82 18.75 6.73 
2001 7.51 50.17 42.32 17.90 6.08 
2002 7.49 49.81 42.69 18.21 6.24 
2003 7.52 49.99 42.49 17.99 6.29 
2004 7.58 49.66 42.76 18.34 6.53 
2005 7.64 49.84 42.52 18.06 6.35 
2006 7.93 49.95 42.12 17.64 6.21 
2007 8.14 50.05 41.81 17.45 6.04 
2008 8.12 49.95 41.93 17.62 6.13 
2009 8.03 50.03 41.93 17.28 5.93 
 
Source: Own computations from data source B. 
 
A similar conclusion can also be reached through the inspection of Table 8, which 
shows the distribution of income of employees according to data source B. Thus, 
according to this data source, in the 1993–2008 period the upper quintile group 
12 
 
increased its share by 1.92 percentage points (from 40.01 per cent to 41.93 per cent), 
with the lions’ share of this increase accruing to the top one per cent, which increased 
s share by 0.88 percentage points (from 5.25 to 6.13 per cent). 
oefficient peaked in the 
te 1990s, with a small decrease occurring in the early 2000s11. 
Table 9: 
withheld PIT, employee social contributions and “net” income, data source A 
 
Year Gi or gro e wit IT 
e
con   
coeffi “net” 
it
 
Tables 9 and 10 provide some summary measures of income inequality, based on data 
source A and data source B, respectively. We observe that the Gini coefficient based on 
data source B is consistently higher than the Gini coefficient based on data source A 
(see also Figure 3). This is quite according to the expectations, as data source B contains 
a very heterogeneous group of employees, with a sizeable number having low computed 
average wages. The narrative of both tables is similar; the Gini c
la
 
The Gini coefficient for gross income and concentration coefficients for 
ni coefficient f
ss incom
Concentration 
coefficient for 
hheld P
Concentration for 
mployee social 
tributions
Concentration 
cient for 
income 
1993 0.282 0.389 0.279 0.259 
1994 0.285 0.464 0.282 0.248 
1995 0.295 0.472 0.293 0.257 
1996 0.299 0.476 0.295 0.261 
1997 0.302 0.480 0.297 0.265 
1998 0.305 0.485 0.302 0.266 
1999 0.313 0.492 0.309 0.273 
2000 0.312 0.490 0.310 0.272 
2001 0.314 0.491 0.312 0.273 
2002 0.310 0.486 0.308 0.269 
2003 0.311 0.486 0.309 0.270 
2004 0.308 0.480 0.303 0.269 
2005 0.308 0.514 0.304 0.264 
2006 0.303 0.509 0.305 0.258 
2007 0.307 0.510 0.307 0.266 
2008 0.307 0.515 0.308 0.265 
 
Source: Own computations from data source A. 
                                                
 
What is the explanation for the large increase in the value of the Gini coefficient in the 
early 1990s? There is little doubt that wage compression and “egalitarianism” of the 
socialist and self-management period “broke loose” in these early years, resulting in a 
significant increase in wage dispersion. This increase can be ascribed also to the poorly 
regulated (or rather unregulated) institutional setting, so characteristic for the early 
transition period in many Central and Eastern European countries. Thus, Štoka-Debevec 
(1997, p. 176) shows that mechanisms for negotiations between social partners were 
introduced in 1994 – with the formation of the Economic and Social Council, a tripartite 
body comprising trade union organisations, employer organizations and the 
government12. An agreement on wage policy, duly signed by the social partners was 
 
11 It is interesting to observe that there is no clear explanation for the increase in income inequality in the 
late 1990s. 
12 Perhaps one could use the term “re-introduced”, as the trade unions had a very important role in the 
socialist and self-managed period. 
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also passed in 1994. In 1995, the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia 
(Državni zbor) passed a law with a long-winded title, The law on promulgation of the 
agreement on wage policy and other labour remuneration and the social compact for 
1995 and the setting of minimum and maximum wage (Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Slovenia 29/95). This marked the first regulation on the minimum wage. For the 
following year, 1996, the minimum wage was stipulated in the social compact and the 
law on the promulgation of the social compact. Starting from 1997, the minimum wage 
was set in a special law on the minimum wage. Overall, it seems that these mechanisms 
ave prevented further significant increases in wage inequality. 
Table 10: 
paid PIT, employee social contributions and net income, data source B  
 
Year Gi r gross income coefficient for paid e
con   
coefficient for net 
i
h
 
The Gini coefficient for gross income and concentration coefficients for 
ni coefficient fo Concentration 
PIT  
Concentration 
coefficient for 
mployee social 
tributions
Concentration 
ncome  
1991 0.290 0.360 0.285 0.276 
1992 0.313 0.395 0.309 0.296 
1993 0.326 0.411 0.323 0.307 
1994 0.330 0.523 0.330 0.291 
1995 0.333 0.525 0.331 0.294 
1996 0.339 0.535 0.335 0.298 
1997 0.340 0.540 0.335 0.299 
1998 0.341 0.541 0.338 0.299 
1999 0.351 0.573 0.348 0.305 
2000 0.352 0.576 0.350 0.306 
2001 0.345 0.547 0.346 0.302 
2002 0.348 0.553 0.349 0.304 
2003 0.346 0.549 0.346 0.302 
2004 0.347 0.552 0.346 0.303 
2005 0.345 0.586 0.344 0.297 
2006 0.337 0.576 0.342 0.289 
2007 0.333 0.572 0.336 0.287 
2008 0.334 0.596 0.336 0.284 
2009 0.336 0.599 0.339 0.285 
 
Source: Own computations from data source B. 
is much less pronounced than the corresponding 
crease for paid PIT (data source B). 
 
What is the role of PIT and its effect on after-tax income? As seen from Tables 9 and 
10, the concentration coefficients for net income have shown a very modest increase 
since 1991. The data in Tables 9 and 10 also clearly indicate that the increasing 
inequality in the distribution of gross incomes has been – to a very large degree – 
neutralized by the PIT. Thus, the new PIT legislation applied in 1994 significantly 
increased the PIT progressivity. Again, the increase in the concentration coefficient for 
withheld PIT (data source A) in 1994 
in
 
The new 1994 PIT legislation obviously took everybody by surprise, so that the 
inequality in the distribution of net incomes of employees – as measured by the 
concentration coefficient for net incomes – actually decreased in that year; the 
concentration coefficient for “net” income (data source A) decreased from 0.259 in 
14 
 
1993 to 0.248 in 1994. The corresponding decrease for the concentration coefficient for 
net income (data source B) was from 0.307 in 1993 to 0.291 in 1994. A large increase in 
the concentration coefficient for paid PIT (series B) is registered in 1999. This is due to 
the aforementioned 2000 Law on extraordinary decrease of tax liability. The law 
reduced the tax liability of low-income groups for 2000 and (retroactively) for 1999. As 
the law expired in 2001, the concentration coefficient for paid PIT returned to its pre-
1999 value. Due to its provisional character, this law did not require any adjustments in 
the withholding tax formula, so that there were virtually no changes in the concentration 
oefficient for withheld PIT (series A) – as seen from Table 9. 
mployee social 
ontributions being higher than the Gini coefficient for gross income14. 
igure 3: The Gini coefficient for gross income, 1991–2009 
 
c
 
What can be said on the values of the concentration coefficients for employee social 
contributions? If all employee incomes would have been subject to social contributions, 
the concentration coefficient for employee social contributions would of course be equal 
to the Gini coefficient for gross income. However, some forms of labour-related 
remuneration are not subject to social contributions; the annual vacation allowance, 
which amounts to some 5 per cent of the total annual gross incomes of employees, 
being the more important. From 2000 onward, the minimum amounts of the annual 
vacation allowance are equal for all sectors. Furthermore, amounts that exceed the 
minimum amount set in the collective agreements are subject to social contributions, so 
that most employers refrain from disbursing amounts higher than the prescribed 
minimum. In other words, almost all employees are being paid the same amount of this 
labour-related remuneration13. This tax treatment of the annual vacation allowance 
would – by itself – result in the concentration coefficient of e
c
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ource: Own computations from data sources A and B. 
                                                
 
S
 
13 However, we recall that not all employers are fulfilling their legal obligation, and that some 10 per cent 
of all employees are not receiving this allowance. 
14 In other words, the annual vacation allowance represents a larger share of gross income for low-income 
employees than high-income employees. 
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Some other income sources are also not subject to social contributions taxation: most 
forms of income from capital (dividends, interest income) and capital gains, as well as 
income from contractual work. These incomes are all strongly concentrated among the 
high-income groups, and this would result in the concentration coefficient for employee 
cial contributions being lower than the Gini coefficient for gross income. 
r employee 
cial contributions being lower than the Gini coefficient for gross income. 
le explanation for the lower 
alues of the Gini coefficient for gross income since 2006. 
 
                                                
so
 
There is yet a third factor, which can influence the relative magnitude of the 
concentration coefficient for employee social contributions as compared to the Gini 
coefficient for gross income: the contribution base for social contributions. This base 
has a lower threshold (but no ceiling), so that the contribution base for pension and 
disability insurance cannot be lower than the minimum wage. This threshold is applied 
from 2000; for the previous years, a different threshold was applied15. The “minimum 
threshold rule” would – by itself – result in the concentration coefficient fo
so
 
Tables 9 and 10 show that, for the 1991–2005 period, the concentration coefficient for 
employee social contributions was somewhat lower than the Gini coefficient for gross 
income. Obviously, the second factor dominated, i.e. that capital income was not subject 
to social contributions16. This has changed from 2006 onward, as the concentration 
coefficient for employee social contributions has been somewhat higher than the Gini 
coefficient for gross income. What happened? Changes in PIT legislation enacted 
toward the end of 2005 introduced schedular taxation of most forms of capital income, 
in a clear departure from the comprehensive income tax approach. Thus, dividends, 
interest income and capital gains were not included in the tax forms, and this explains 
the changes in the relative positions of the concentration coefficient for employee social 
contributions and the Gini coefficient for gross income. The exclusion of most forms of 
capital income from the tax forms also provides a plausib
v
 
15 The 1992 Pension and Disability Insurance Act stipulates that the minimum contribution base cannot 
be lower than the minimum pension assessment base, increased by the average PIT rate and social 
contribution rate (article 231). 
16 For more on the concentration of incomes from capital, see Stanovnik and Verbič (2005b). 
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6. The dynamics of tax progressivity 
 
The personal income tax is a progressive tax, meaning that high-income persons pay 
relatively more than low-income persons. There are several widely used measures of tax 
progressivity, most of which rely on Lorenz-type curves and summary measures. Here, 
we will present only two of these measures. One such measure is the Reynolds and 
Smolensky (1977) index, defined as: 
 
R *S G G= −
G *G
TK C G
, 
 
where  is the Gini coefficient for gross (pre-tax) income and  is the Gini 
coefficient for net (after-tax) income. Kakwani (1977) suggested the following measure: 
 
= −
TC G
, 
 
where  is the concentration coefficient for taxes and is the Gini coefficient for 
gross (pre-tax) income. The Kakwani index of progressivity has some desirable features 
(cf. Kakwani, 1977; Creedy, 1999). The Reynolds–Smolensky index measures the 
redistributive effect of the tax system, and this effect depends not only on the 
concentration of tax payments, but also on the average tax rate; the higher the tax rate, 
the more redistributive is the tax system. In contrast, the Kakwani index measures 
directly the concentration of tax payments and its value does not depend on the “size” of 
the tax system; due to this desirable property, we will be using this measure in 
presenting our results, depicted in Figure 4. 
 
The Kakwani index of progressivity is computed using three different data sets. The 
value of the index based on data from data source A is computed using the withheld 
PIT, as no information on final PIT liability is available, whereas the value of the index 
based on data source B will be computed using (a) withheld PIT, and (b) final PIT 
liability. 
 
Computation with option (a) will provide yet another opportunity to compare the values 
obtained from data sources A and B. As seen from Figure 4, the values of the Kakwani 
index for withheld PIT based on data sources A and B are quite comparable. Of course, 
the Kakwani index computed using paid PIT is consistently higher than the index 
computed using withheld PIT, as the data of the Tax Administration of the Republic of 
Slovenia show that tax refunds are strongly concentrated among low-income groups, 
and additional tax payments are, likewise, strongly concentrated in higher income 
groups. 
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Figure 4: Kakwani index of progressivity, 1991–2009 
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Note: Kakwani index of progressivity based on data source A is computed using only the concentration 
coefficient for withheld PIT. For data source B the index is computed using: (a) withheld PIT, and (b) 
paid PIT. 
 
Source: Own computations from data sources A and B. 
 
As seen from Figure 4, the Kakwani index increased by leaps; these leaps occurred in 
the years of introduction of new PIT legislation. Thus, the first big leap occurred in 
1994, when the new PIT legislation (Zdoh) replaced the 1991 Personal Income Tax Act. 
The second leap in this index occurred in 1999, when the Law on extraordinary 
decrease of tax liability decreased the PIT tax liability for low-income groups. Upon 
expiration of this law, the Kakwani index fell “back into line”. A further increase in this 
index occurred in 2005, when the new PIT Act (ZDoh-1) came into force. 
 
It is quite interesting to observe that the PIT legislation which came into force in 2007 
(Zdoh-2) did not have an impact on Kakwani index, in spite of the fact that the marginal 
tax rate was lowered from 50 per cent to 41 per cent. A more detailed comparison of the 
PIT burden according to the PIT parameters, valid in 2006, and new parameters applied 
in 2007 (Zdoh-2), shows that inframarginal rates have been reduced, whereas the 
marginal rates for the upper end of the income distribution have been increased. The net 
summary effect of these changes on the Kakwani index has been negligible. Finally, the 
introduction of a differentiated personal allowance in 2008 has – quite expectedly – 
resulted in increased tax progressivity. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
 
Our analysis, based on primary incomes of employees, as reported in the personal 
income tax returns, has shown that income inequality in the distribution of primary 
incomes of employees in Slovenia has increased since Slovenia gained independence in 
1991. However, most of this increase occurred in the first years of transition, i.e. early 
1990s. Starting from 1994, when the institutional setting – the Economic and Social 
Council, collective agreements and legislation on minimum wages – were firmly 
established, the increases in inequality were quite modest. And not only that; the 
increases in the inequality of net incomes were virtually negligible, due to the strong 
mitigating effect of personal income tax legislation. In other words, the personal income 
tax system acted as an effective brake, preventing the increases in inequality of gross 
incomes to be transmitted to increases in inequality of net incomes. 
 
Considering that primary incomes have been steadily increasing (in real terms) since 
1992, and that inequalities in net incomes have remained stable, one can infer that there 
have been important welfare improvements. To put it simply: the distribution of 
incomes in recent years is, from the social point of view, more desirable than the 
distribution of incomes in the early years of transition17. However, these gains are not 
“cast in stone”, and it will be important to monitor changes in the distribution of 
incomes during this protracted economic crisis and its mutations. Slovenia has long 
been criticized for its unwillingness to undertake more fundamental reforms – 
particularly reforms of the labour market and its social security system. More dramatic 
events might change this – almost idyllic – picture of stable income inequality. 
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17 This assertion is based on certain assumptions. Obviously, we have Lorenz dominance, i.e. the more 
recent generalised Lorenz curves (state 1) are strictly above the generalised Lorenz curves from the early 
transition years (state 2). Assuming the Bentham’s social welfare function and individual utility functions 
having the usual desirable properties (strict concavity, i.e. U’(x) > 0, U’’(x) < 0 for all x), then, applying 
Shorrocks theorem (Lambert, 1993), the social welfare in state 2 is greater than in state 1. 
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